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SINCE 2006, abolition of user fees at the point of service delivery for care and drugs has been one of
the pillars of the public health approach proposed by the WHO for scaling up access to medical
treatment and care for PLWHA in low-income countries (Gilks et al., 2006). However, provisions to
define the modalities for implementing this recommendation have not been made. This absence of
directives has led to numerous concerns, and even reluctance, among public health programme
directors in low-income countries, raising questions about the economic feasibility of such a decision
and how to implement a policy that supports free access to HIV/AIDS-specific care and services.
Moving from the provision of free drugs to the provision of complete free care requires the
implementation of effective and sustainable funding management. There is a danger that free access
without secure and properly functioning funding will quickly work against the desired objectives. The
negative side effects of a poorly-run free access policy—breaks in supply, lower service quality, under-
the-counter payments—have frequently been described in the economic and public health literature.
In Senegal, several studies have analysed the funding of the national AIDS treatment programme
(Ciss et al., 2002; Vinard et al., 2003), the programme’s financial accessibility (Lanièce et al., 2003)
and the evaluation of extra-ARV costs for patients (Canestri et al., 2004). They have demonstrated the
inefficiency and drawbacks of payment systems, as well as the benefits—particularly in treatment
adherence—of complete free medical treatment. A 2006 study, presented in this book (cf. chapter 13),
concluded that complete free access for all medical treatment would be a sustainable expense for the
State budget and could easily be covered without disrupting the 2007–2011 funding plan.
In 2007, following these studies, we explored the various avenues through which the decision to
provide complete free access to care for PLWHA integrated into the country’s public health system
could be implemented. This chapter summarises the results of that study. In the first part, we describe
and analyse the various alternatives for funding medical care for PLWHA, while taking into account the
existing systems for free access to other medical payments or social actors (ex. childbirth, the poor,
seniors). In the second part, we present a detailed reflection on the implementation of a “purchasing
fund” system—a system that appears to be the most effective for guaranteeing feasibility and
sustainability.
2A short history of the Senegalese System
In Senegal, patients are charged for public health care services, regardless of the health care
structure (rural or urban health centre, regional or national hospital). Only a few medical conditions
and services, and care offered to certain social categories are provided for free. Hence, drugs for
tuberculosis or leprosy have been distributed free of charge since the colonial era; those who are
categorised as “poor” receive free access to care in all of the country’s health structures; in 2005, an
experimental initiative in the country’s poorest regions led to free childbirth in health centres and
caesareans in hospitals; and in 2006, a national plan to ensure free health care for people over the
age of 60 was initiated (Sesame Plan). In 2007, other initiatives were being studied, and the
implementation of systems that provide free care became a much-discussed issue, well beyond that of
HIV/AIDS.
In the HIV/AIDS domain, ARVs have been subsidised since the national programme’s inception,
making them more readily available to people with low purchasing power. These subsidies varied
between 50% and 95% of treatment costs, and a complete subsidy was granted to those who were
most destitute or who met various social criteria (e.g. PLWHA association members) (Desclaux et al.,
2003). The payment amounts had been lowered several times before December 2003, when free
access to ARV drugs was announced for all patients living in the country regardless of therapeutic
regimen (first- or second-line). Furthermore, HIV testing is free in all of the country’s public health
structures. CD4 lymphocyte counts and treatment for certain opportunistic infections (anti-tuberculosis
and oral, genital and neuro-meningeal antifungal agents; Cotrimoxazole) are also offered free of
charge. The Ministry of Health has also provided various non-specific drugs (antibiotics, anti-
inflammatories, iron, etc.), though this has been sporadic, depending on its supply. Hence, medical
care is not totally free, since patients must pay for consultations, complementary exams (biological
exams other than CD4 counts and medical imaging), hospitalisation and drugs other than those cited.
In practice, many actors involved in medical care for PLWHA have set up procedures to limit patient
payments, and these have even resulted in complete free care. These initiatives derive from: the
CNLS (National Council for the Fight Against AIDS) through, for example, contributing biological
analysis equipment to health structures; the Ministry of Health itself (via the Division for the Fight
Against AIDS and STIs), which provides reagents and drugs; health structure (health centre or
hospital) directors, who decide not to bill PLWHA for medical consultations; and various associations
and national or foreign NGOs who cover all or part of health expenses for PLWHA. These initiatives
rely on various funding sources—international (the Global Fund), national, private and public. Hence,
medical care for PLWHA is often free or partially free. However, throughout the country as a whole,
this free access varies considerably from one region to another, given the timing and depending on
the geographical areas and domains of intervention of the various actors. Variability in distribution
creates gaps that oblige patients to still pay for part of their care.
Given this context, this study, which aims to compare the merits of different modes of implementation
of “free access”, is based on an analysis of the activity and funding of four district health centres
(Bignona, Ziguinchor, Thiés and Mbour) and two regional hospitals (Thiés and Ziguinchor). In-depth
interviews were conducted with various administrators and health professionals in charge of public
structures and administrator associations. Their accounts and those of support organs were studied.
These results are not included here since our objective is not to present monographs but to explore
fundamental problems.
This sample does not systematically represent Senegalese health structures. However, it gives a
rather complete idea of the variety of situations by including structures with high levels of support
(from NGOs, projects and community financing schemes) and others that are only supported by the
State. The pros and cons of the various situations were then discussed in detail within the relevant
services from the Ministry of Health and with health directors from various donors.
The content of the debate has been particularly rich because this study was carried out at a critical
moment, when health officials at the highest level were engaged in an overall reflection on the subject.
This stemmed in particular from the implementation of a programme that provided free care for seniors
and conducted work on social protection in rural settings1 and a UNFPA evaluation of the policy for
free childbirth.
                                                
1  - Agro-Sylvo-Pastoral Policy Law and a Ministry of Agriculture working group.
3There is a wide variety of funding modalities for the different elements of PLWHA care in Senegal. It is
therefore possible to compare the advantages and disadvantages of these modalities and to analyse
their potential with regard to scaling up HIV/AIDS care.
Five possible types of funding
In fact, five possible types of funding exist, which we shall analyse individually: provision in-kind of
products necessary for the consumption of free services; provision of equipment to enable other
revenues to compensate for losses created by free access; increased public budgetary allocations;
care specifically for the poor, and reimbursement for free services by a third party.
• Funding by supplying products
After several years of a relatively complex payment system, the Senegalese authorities announced
free access to ARV drugs in public structures. This choice was justified by the specificity, high cost
and limited number of these products. A supply system was created that was channelled through the
Fann Hospital pharmacy; from there, supply was integrated into the national public distribution system
for pharmaceutical products (National Supply Pharmacy and Regional Pharmacies). Studies have
shown that difficulties in scaling up in the country’s different regions resulted more from problems in
monitoring these supplies and managing drug stocks than from funding needs (Collard and Taverne,
2005; Diouf, 2007).
This free supply system functions relatively well for drugs as specific as ARVs or anti-tuberculosis
drugs. The problems are relatively more complex when treating opportunistic infections, because of
the variety of drugs that must be managed. Moreover, the experience has been less positive for kits to
offset free childbirth in terms of their definition, cost and transport (Ndiaye and Dieme, 2007).
Logistical problems
Thanks to funding from the State or international donors, drug donations for opportunistic infections
have been distributed in recent years.2 They are significant, but do not cover the entire need. The
contributions are decided at the central level on the basis of available funding rather than the needs of
the health structures.
Depending on the health structure, these contributions require specific management by the recipients.
Sometimes, these drugs are found in consultation units, sometimes in the office cabinet of a health-
centre social worker, sometimes in the structure’s pharmacy, etc. For the moment, this system works
relatively well, but it will be difficult to control these stocks at the current level or if they increase in
proportion to need. The problems will be related to real assessment of need as much as the possible
“outflow.” Since this involves the same drugs as those sold at pharmacies, the separation could be
difficult to maintain given the urgency of certain demands and the pressure of some temptations. A
patient’s path to finding available drugs will become more complex between the different suppliers
(free pharmacy vs. paying public pharmacy vs. the private pharmacy).
Tests and reagents for laboratory exams have also been donated to several structures. Generally,
these are entrusted to laboratories, but even then, keeping stocks separated is not easy for products
in everyday use.3 The logistical problems did not arise too often because, in the experimental phase,
contacts were frequent but the reliability of these supply systems is cause for concern, especially in
the more remote structures.
Organisational impact
The risks of poor management and waste do not originate in free access itself but in the failure to
quantify these donations. These stocks are not always recorded in a common system and the
structures sometimes do not even know the amount donated. Therefore, a structure can be under the
impression that it will recover its costs while its operating costs are covered by donations (when stocks
have not been compartmentalised precisely).
The first major drawback of this type of funding is that is removes responsibility from the director of the
health structure. The problem can be blamed on the fact that the centre was not supplied or that the
                                                
2  - 32 million CFA francs in 2005; 38 million CFA francs in 2006.
3  - This is the case for nearly all reagents used in the initial assessment for antiretroviral treatment.
4donation was not appropriate. The indicators on which donations are based are always difficult to
establish and give rise to much discussion (as was the case for delivery kits). Senegal is committed to
the principle of decentralisation, founded on health structures maintaining control over their orders.
Having the health structures purchase products directly (by going through a wholesale group) is the
simplest system for ensuring this autonomy.
The second drawback for funding through grants comes from the fact that workload (in terms of time
and quality) is not taken into account. Given the prices for ARVs, services account for a relatively low
proportion of treatment costs, but this proportion will increase, as it does for all chronic diseases. In
fact, payment for services plays a critical role in motivating personnel in most of the country. The
difficulties encountered with free childbirth clearly illustrate these problems.4 Non-payment for services
can lead to unmotivated staff. This will have a negative impact on the quality of services if no other
mechanism is proposed.
• Funding through equipment donations
Certain donors prefer to fund the purchase of equipment under the pretext that aid for operating costs
would not be “sustainable.”
The preference for investment
Funding for increasingly large investments reveals difficulties that are particularly sensitive to
sustainability when equipment maintenance and operation is left to local resources. In fact, funding
donated equipment is certainly easily administered (invitation to tender) with maximum visibility (media
coverage of delivered equipment that is new and labelled!). It is easier for a donor to manage this type
of funding simply because the donor handles the acquisition and distribution but is not involved in
controlling the equipment’s final use. In theory, an invitation to tender is easier to control than a
subsidy system.
Even when theoretical needs remain high, the equipment’s use is often limited by the capabilities of
those using it (level of training and frequent turnover of trained staff). In short, capacities for absorption
will also be limited by the necessary expenditures for operation and maintenance of this apparatus. In
many countries (including Senegal), some equipment (particularly the flow cytometers) is not
operating, due to poor maintenance or lack of properly trained staff. To compensate for these
drawbacks, international aid is being distributed more evenly, with the aid organisations taking more
responsibility for ongoing expenses.
Compensating losses through new revenues
Many donors (particularly the World Bank) have made large donations of laboratory equipment. The
external effects on the laboratories’ overall activity are significant both in obtaining new revenues from
other exams and appreciably improving staff motivation. However, it is difficult to assess this impact or
even to gauge the real financial gains. This so-called equivalence (additional revenues compared to
lost profits from free exams) does not encourage transparent management and could often be used as
an excuse for excessive fees. Many structures have already set out to create capital through a high
number of exams that are often unnecessary, unused or useless. Indeed, the funding of equipment
runs the risk of exacerbating the biomedical approach and the pursuit for technological sophistication
that is one of the major problems facing health systems in Africa.
• Funding through budgetary allocations
Increasing budgetary allocations appears to be the simplest way to fund administrative expenses, all
the more so since budgetary aid has become one of the preferred channels for international aid. A
significant effort has been made to improve the budgetary circuit. Nevertheless, the current situation
must be taken into account before advocating the use of this modality for urgent expenses in the short
term.
Funding at the district level
First of all, it is necessary to carefully consider the role played by budgetary allocations in funding
                                                
4  - The midwives received compensation linked to payments for deliveries.
5health structures. At the district level, less than half of revenues come from the State. The share is
greater if public sector salaries are counted, but the revenues themselves play a role that is
proportionally greater because they are much more easily mobilised. With decentralisation, public
funding is carried out by the local authorities, which use the Decentralisation Allocation Fund (Fonds
de Dotation de la Décentralisation — FDD). The local authorities make a very modest contribution
from their own resources.
However, the structures are normally informed about the availability of these funds in the month of
August during the current year. In October, the structure administrators send their orders to the
mayors, who generally sanction expenditures only in November or December. The payments are then
made by accountants in the Treasury (during our investigation, in December no payment had been
made and a large proportion of the assigned funds had not been disbursed). These obstacles are
caused either by gridlock at city hall or long delays at the Treasury. Meanwhile, in order to ensure that
structures survive, assigned funds are disbursed from the central level biannually (for fuel,
maintenance, office supplies). In the study sample, these funds only amount up to 5.6% of the public
allowance. These constraints must be taken into consideration if funding through the channel of the
State budget is to be ensured.
The increasing of budget allocations (assigned funds or the Decentralisation Allocation Fund) is
inevitably constrained by annual budgeting and by the current rigidity of the funding process. A quick
analysis of the timing of this public spending — while modest — confirms this problem. The accounting
system (particularly with its requirement to pass through the Treasury’s local services) was designed
by the Napoleonic administration for tasks that are mainly derived from sovereign power. It appears
difficult to adapt these volumes to the scale of activity produced.
To indirectly fund structures that have no legal autonomy, it is also possible to envision funding the
management committees that have association status. Regional mechanisms used to collect invoices
have also been proposed within the framework of the Sesame Plan, though this had not yet been
implemented at the time of this study. Nevertheless, it appears difficult to entrust these payments to a
private structure on the basis of rules for public contracts.
Funding public institutions
Increasing the allocation to public institutions seems to be a less rigid channel. This system already
operates within the regional hospitals, and it is a matter of granting administrative autonomy to the
district hospitals, thus greatly facilitating funding modalities. This reform is a large-scale task because
it would eliminate administrative associations. The district hospital would then be under the direction of
an administrative council, and the chief doctor would have greater administrative power. This more
“entrepreneurial” reasoning is fully compatible with funding an activity. However, if the funds are used
directly by the institution, payment of the subsidy will follow the public funding circuit (going through
the Treasury services annually or biannually). It will be difficult to adapt to changes in the activity. It is
important to find an automatic and adaptive mechanism extending to the most peripheral levels.
• Expanding the care system for the poor
Confronted with budget constraints, funding modalities targeting specific individuals have often been
sought, particularly in extending systems to care for the poor. Analysis of these modalities proves
worthwhile because it already involves a large number of PLWHA. In each structure, in both health
centres and regional hospitals, a social worker is in charge of identifying and monitoring poor patients.
In general, the social worker also plays a central role in the care of PLWHA and is responsible for the
preliminary social survey prior to initiating ARV treatment.
Although the preliminary social surveys of patients prior to initiating ART and the surveys determining
payment exemption status for the poor are treated in two different files, they are usually carried out by
the same person. Exemption procedures are also renewed for each medical act for both the poor and
PLWHA, creating redundancy in the files.
Those in charge of health structures often complain about the workload caused by free care for the
poor, but the share of the budget devoted to exemption of payments remains quite modest. At the
district level, only five people classified as destitute received services each month, and it was
estimated that only 1.6% of expenditure was not recovered because of these exemptions. This is a
very low amount in the poor provinces, especially when compared to the 10% that is often cited in
6implementing the Bamako Initiative. At the regional-hospital level, administrators emphasise the high
number of exemptions (approximately 500 services without payment per year) but the percentage of
revenues lost is still relatively low (less than 1%).56
Given budgetary constraints, funding medical care for PLWHA with funds for the poor seems
inadequate. In a structure that is highly involved in this care (such as the “Silence” Hospital in
Ziguinchor), 75% of the poor are PLWHA. And yet, the percentage of people who are exempted as
poor is still low. Therefore, the situation risks becoming untenable as patients face impoverishment as
a result of their deteriorating physical status. Even if the number of poor patients increases
considerably, the system could only cover some of the PLWHA, and no other cases, which would
inevitably cause tensions.
The situation is less serious in the regional hospitals where the proportion of PLWHA in the total
number of patients is relatively lower. As an example, we gathered statistics for exemptions over a
five-month period at the Ziguinchor Hospital for 2006
Regional hospital Number of persons exempt
Ziguinchor Laboratory tests Drugs
2006 Total: non-paying PLWHA >60 years Total: non-paying PLWHA >60 years
January 13 1 2 22 4 2
February 12 2 0 43 3 3
March 18 2 1 36 2 0
April 14 3 2 31 1 3
May 10 2 1 41 2 2
June 5 0 0 21 1 1
Table 1: The number of PLWHA among those exempt from payment at the regional hospital in Ziguinchor, 2006.
In this example, which can be considered fairly representative, the burden of PLWHA appears
relatively low and comparable to that of exemptions for seniors. Moreover, the number of unpaid
services appears very low in our view for a structure that treats approximately 120 PLWHA, and it is
highly probable that the situation is going to rapidly deteriorate. In fact, the information system does
not make it easy to determine whether these are the same people who are exempt from payment for
laboratory tests and drugs (as well as other services).
This example demonstrates the difficulty in using mechanisms to treat the poor; especially with scaling
up, the number of PLWHA will grow considerably.
• Reimbursement for free services by a third party
Rather than target people, it is often more useful to target invoices and specific care. Various
experiences in reimbursing invoices were implemented in Senegal by different partners (NGOs,
community financing schemes and the State).
The need to strengthen administration of one’s own resources
These mechanisms aim to strengthen a health structure’s system for managing its own resources.
Despite all its adverse effects, one of the Bamako Initiative’s chief positive impacts was to increase the
involvement of health structures in managing their own resources. Revenues earned in health centres
cover the greatest share of costs for drugs and a significant share of staff wages. These revenues are
generated by administrative associations (health committees), which collect revenue and decide how it
will be spent in mutual agreement with the chief doctor (and with a double signature). The chief doctor
is usually quite involved in the management of these funds, and relationships are not always easy in
this de facto co-administration. Equilibrium is established with the necessary checks and balances,
and the partners manage to limit the risks of blocking expenditure.
However, even if the amounts generated sometimes reach a high total, they are low relative to the
needs of a health structure (on average less than two euros per habitant in the sample, 0.8 euros per
habitant for drugs). Even if reference to “health committees’ wealth” is becoming commonplace,
                                                
5  - The identification and provision of care for “paupers” in health care systems in French-speaking Africa present
insurmountable problems. See Ridde, V. (2007).
7counting on their own resources to fund free access is not reasonable, and certainly dangerous in
principle, as this may discourage administrators. On the other hand, the principle of free access can
strengthen this management if the funding mechanisms allow for increased revenues by making
demand from a third-party payer solvent.
In several health structures, care for PLWHA was reimbursed by a donor through the intermediary of
an NGO (FHI in Ziguinchor, Enda in Mbour and Médecins du Monde-Spain in Saint Louis, for
example). The care system did not require additional documents and was easily managed by a local
office. The payments quickly adapted to demand. However, these practices corresponded to a project
rationale that was temporary and variable. Meanwhile, the population’s payment habits change slowly.
With the termination of FHI projects in 2006, for example, the amount of unpaid invoices suddenly
increased. The NGOs did not have a proper control system to verify the accuracy of invoices both in
terms of what kind of service was performed and the identity of the beneficiaries.
Potential for community financing schemes and health insurance
In some countries (for example, Rwanda), some donors (World Bank, Caritas) have given funds to
community financing schemes for PLWHA, thus ensuring coverage that is identical to that received by
paying members and without having to generate reimbursements for individual invoices. We could not
identify similar cases in Senegal, either because the community financing schemes were too few,6 or
because no donor wanted to take on this responsibility. Mutual aid projects are being studied by the
coordination organ of the community financing schemes in Thiès. The principle would be that the
community financing scheme would contribute its own funds for the care of PLWHA. Some community
financing schemes will have already developed this system to cover one or two poor people. However,
these schemes have very limited funding, which could raise questions about the status of these “free”
members in the scheme’s administration if they become numerous.
Community financing schemes, in fact, may play a social role more than a financial one: many only
survive because they are subsidised not only by an international donor but through preferential pricing
from the hospital. For example, the Saint Jean de Dieu Hospital in Thiès uses part of the community
financing scheme network to help parishioners (with prices that are twice as low). It is uncertain
whether these schemes make it possible to reach those who are the poorest and the least socially
integrated. In any case, though useful in other aspects, these experiments remain too fragile to take
on an additional load.
Senegalese law requires businesses to organise medical coverage for their salaried employees. Some
are grouped under IPMs (Institut de Prévoyance Médicale – Employer Health Insurance Schemes)
which cover their care and could therefore be led to cover PLWHA (Laborde-Balen and Taverne,
2004). However, this care is primarily delivered in the private sector (pharmacies or medical practices).
In all cases, the percentage of PLWHA in the formal sector still remains relatively low. Nevertheless,
useful lessons can be drawn from these funding mechanisms. One of the fundamental principles of
these reimbursement systems is the principle of a starting-provision of funds, which is gradually
audited based on justified expenditures. This provision, which was included in the Sesame Plan, is
essential for ensuring trust from the service provider.
Reimbursement of costs by the State
Most regional hospitals are reimbursed for invoices for caesareans that theoretically should be free.
The invoices are transmitted to the Division of Reproductive Health and then paid in addition to the
subsidy from the institution. Proof of expenses is verified by a withdrawal, and even if the amount of
this withdrawal (which does not always cover the costs of the necessary service package) may be
under discussion, the justification system is relatively simple.
A similar system has been set up for seniors. The hospital sends invoices to the Seniors Bureau of the
Ministry of Health. Analysis of these invoices and calculating the reimbursed service package is much
more complex than with deliveries. It is still too early to assess this recently implemented system.
Nevertheless, one can already speculate about the advisability of adding a similar system for PLWHA
with control for invoices assigned to an AIDS Division.
                                                
6  - There are only three communities financing schemes in Ziguinchor, covering less than 1000 persons in total.
The situation is similar in Mbour. There is none in Bignona. Thiés (with approximately 40 community financing
schemes) is an exceptional situation, linked to the region’s history and sociology.
8The various divisions under the Ministry of Health have not been trained in these invoice analyses, nor
are they responsible for regulating the multiple reimbursements demanded by the various health
structures. In short, considerable gains in efficiency could be obtained by implementing joint
management and by avoiding compartmentalisation of different reimbursements. The services are
different but are often justified, based on similar principles (pricing techniques), and concern the same
partners (contractualisation and accreditation of structures). Hence, the notion of a joint purchasing
fund appears to be an alternative worth analysing.
The feasibility of a purchasing fund for PLWHA
The practice of “funds” has extended into developing countries for various reasons (targeting, visibility
and absorption of funding, management control). This may appear contradictory to the 2005 Paris
Accord recommendations (integration of aid, use of unique and local procedures), but the principle of
a fund can also be a tool for putting them to better use (pooling resources, improved governance).
Thus, it is important to clearly identify the characteristics of the fund that is to be implemented and to
analyse how it can cover PLWHA. With the existence of several types of funds, we will begin be
discussing these various types, then we will investigate the status and organisation of a fund for
PLWHA care, the modalities for accreditation and contractualisation, and fund-raising to study the
feasibility of this kind of fund in the specific case of Senegal.
•  The different types of funds
Generally speaking, there are four types of funds. These can be categorised by: the funding recipient,
the way beneficiaries are selected, the extent of coverage they provide, and the different funding
mechanisms.
Type of fund Subsidizing funds Equity funds Performance aid
funds
Purchasing funds
Recipient Inputs People Activities, ratios Service package
Selection Need for services Poverty criteria Public-health priority Demand for certain
services
Coverage Supplementary All for those selected Supplementary All for the chosen
package (except co-
payment)
Mechanism Strengthening supply Making demand
solvent
Strengthening supply Making demand solvent
Table 2: Summary of the main characteristics of the four main types of funds.
– Subsidising funds are the most widespread; most projects include them in some form. They finance
inputs (allowances, operations, materials) that are often complementary to State budgets or to their
own receipts, and contingent on the needs for services (identified by donors in negotiation with
authorities);
– Health equity funds were initiated by NGOs (in Cambodia, for example [Noirhomme and Thomé,
2006) and are now being used to fight poverty. They make some of the demand from certain target
populations solvent, on the basis of poverty criteria (but could also be based on sociological or
medical attributes);
– Performance aid funds strengthen supply, complementing State budgets on the basis of
performance indicators. Given the complexity of these indicators, they were set up, temporarily, on an
experimental and small-scale basis. Some countries, however, (for example, Rwanda) would like to
use them as part of a national strategy (Soeters et al., 2006);
– Purchasing funds draw on certain aspects of each type of fund, and therefore they often share
points in common. They follow a different logic, however. Purchasing funds finance demand, like
health equity funds, but are essentially based not on people but on a services package. Health equity
funds may also focus on certain services, but only for particular populations. Purchasing funds have
universal coverage, even if the chosen services package could be focused more particularly on one
part of the population. For example, the wealthiest will choose other services. In this case, the
selection criterion depends on patients’ choice rather than revenue.
9Purchasing funds differ from performance aid funds in that they finance the demand and not the
supply. The package that is financed by purchasing funds could also be pegged to public health
principles, but the patient remains a primary decision-maker. Purchasing funds could be linked to
accreditations that ensure minimal quality of service, but the financing will depend primarily on the
quantity produced — in other words, the patients’ choices.
Figure 1: Funding supply and demand through a Purchasing Fund.
These different funds could be complementary. Subsidising funds could improve the quality of
services (training or equipment, for example) offered by a structure, so that it can better respond to the
demand that is made solvent by purchasing funds. The type of fund used depends on the services
package offered, the power given (or left) to patients, the capacity of the information system to
measure services rendered, and the nature of services that cannot easily be quantified. Political
interest in purchasing funds comes from the willingness to give more power to patients, who are
increasingly well-informed, but whose financial means do not allow them to bear the costs of care.
• The status and organisation of a fund for PLWHA care
This type of fund is unique insofar as it addresses a specific population (as in a health equity fund) and
is for a particular service (as in a purchasing fund). Nevertheless, in its logic, it is closer to the
purchasing fund because it does not entail the difficulties in selecting patients on the basis of income
criteria involved in the health equity fund.
The main problem with these funds is ensuring their proper management. Dividing up the State should
not be an opportunity to reduce controls. But the control system must correspond to a rationale of
fiduciary funds (based on rules set by officials) and not necessarily the sovereign functions of the
State (with its slow pace linked to centralisation from the Treasury accountants). Regular audits could
be conducted and funding sustainability correctly linked to good management.
Different statuses are possible by bringing in participation from civil society, the beneficiaries
themselves (PLWHA), the health professionals, the private sector (outside of the health domain), and
particularly the financial sector (banks and micro-credit7). We believe it would be useful for
international donors also to be included on the administrative council. State representation is an issue
that must be carefully studied. In any case, the Ministry of Health would retain supervisory authority.
The creation of these funds should provide an opportunity for reflection on new modes of governance.
It is uncertain whether models emerging from a kind of “health democracy” would be the most efficient.
This type of orientation in managing health structures often leads to blockages (the revenues
accumulate and end up being spent on heavy equipment, such as an ambulance). Purchasing funds
are founded on a logic that is technical and administrative, converging toward a new “entrepreneurial”
                                                
7  - Micro-financing cannot fund care for HIV/AIDS patients, but these institutions can act as channels to ensure
improved management and allocation of resources (for example, community banks in rural settings).
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logic for autonomous institutions (and no longer for administrative associations). Policy choices
concerning the care services packet and accreditation conditions are made upstream.
The level of decentralisation of funds depends on the number of patients receiving care. A certain
threshold is needed to develop sufficient expertise to negotiate accreditations and analyse invoices.
During implementation, a central agency would be sufficient but with the development of the
decentralisation of ISAARV (Senegalese Initiative for Access to ARV), the regional level appear to be
more suitable. A service covering between 300 and 600 PLWHA in 10 structures could continue with
light administration. In the long term, if the fund covers many other risks and people, a structure at the
level of each district could be envisaged later. Additionally, with this decentralisation, participation from
local authorities could be envisaged, to encourage them to also increase their funding to the health
sector. Experiences such as the DISC Project (USAID) have shown that the difficulties in local funding
result from administrative rigidity as much as meagre local resources. The mayors may be incited to
contribute to these purchasing funds through their participation in the management committees.
• Accreditation and contractualisation
The process of accreditation has already been conducted by the Division for the Fight Against AIDS
and STIs (DLSI), which carefully monitored conditions when each service provider started offering
triple-therapy treatment. Financing through a fund could also be an important tool in verifying and
ensuring that service quality is maintained.
Conditions for purchasing services can draw on the efforts developed by many projects that have
worked on community financing schemes (pricing, withdrawals). In the rationale for funds, the
information system becomes a determining factor for funding. Health structures are therefore more
motivated to carry out this demanding task; nevertheless, web-based data-processing tools can
greatly simplify this administration. On the other hand, this calls for monitoring of the quality of the
data, which could be biased for financial reasons. Thus, the contractual policy must include
monitoring, supervision and dialogue that will truly allow the system gradually to evolve.
Figure 2: Purchasing funds at the source of a two-level contractual policy.
The contractual policy extends out to two levels, between the health structure and the purchasing fund
and between the health structure and staff. This second aspect is essential for ensuring that personnel
are sufficiently motivated to improve service. In the beginning, it could take on simple forms linked to
attendance, since absenteeism is one of the main problems. Financing staff through the intermediary
of a purchasing fund offers a much more flexible performance-related system than global measures to
raise public sector salaries.
• Fundraising
The rationale for purchasing funds prioritises expenditure analysis by recognising from the start the
necessity for public or international funding. It is better to recognise this situation in a number of health
domains for a poor population than to create mechanisms that have considerable transaction costs
and that collect ridiculously low amounts. This requires the creation of a system to manage the funds
efficiently. In the end, institutional sustainability will ensure financial sustainability.
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In this way, the State would be further encouraged to commit to health care funding, whereas the
recovery of costs often poses an opportunity for the State to disengage. On the other hand,
autonomous management of these funds ensures a clear separation between the State’s sovereign
functions—especially in defining standards and strategies—and the function of public health funding.
The Department of Health carefully maintains its prescribed role. The funds can be fully autonomous
by being under the coordination of the Division for the Fight Against AIDS and STIs.
Several bodies (Global Fund, ESTHER, etc.) aim to cover a precise number of PLWHA. The
purchasing fund offers them a simple mechanism for achieving this objective. Other resources (from
the diaspora and private sector) can be better channelled, rather than distributed to numerous projects
that are difficult to control, maintain or even complete. Purchasing funds are organised quite similarly
to therapeutic trials. The Regional Centre for Research and Care at the Fann Hospital (CRCF) is well
accustomed to reimbursing care for certain patients; a purchasing fund ensures treatment continuity
for patients who have completed trials.
Managing purchasing funds can enter into the logic of these “common funds” from donors, which are
often a transition towards a sectoral approach. Donors are increasingly devoting their resources to this
type of approach and, due to the problems in the budgetary circuit, are seeking alternative funding
mechanisms. These funds could constitute an interesting structure, while remaining open to other
services if the domain of free access expands. This is not a case of creating temporary structures by
“pooling aid”; rather, it involves creating national institutions that are responsible for an essential role
in funding health care.
Conclusion
This exploratory study reveals that a diverse range of systems contributes to funding care for PLWHA
in Senegal. These various systems all help to limit patient payments, though with little coordination,
and to achieve free access at the treatment sites. Pursuant to this study, and taking into consideration
the administrative organisation of the health system, it appears that implementing a treatment fund
based on the purchasing fund model would be the most suitable system for implementing universal
free access to care for PLWHA.
The principle behind purchasing funds may seem like a restructuring on the scale of the funding
system. In fact, it only extends and synthesises past experiences. Purchasing funds follow the logic of
insurance in several ways: the buying of a predetermined service package (contractualisation and
accreditation); the use of the sectoral approach (by “pooling” public, private and international
resources); results-based funding (a payment for services rendered); and management that is
independent of public budgetary bottlenecks (with the participation of civil society). While other funding
mechanisms for free access risk harming the management system for health structures, the
purchasing fund preserves the autonomy of health structures in managing themselves, one of the
principles gained from past reforms. Moreover, a purchasing fund can be implemented in a way that
complements other systems already in operation. Thus, it enables a gradual transition that will not
clash with the current situation.
The rationale behind a purchasing fund could be applied to different situations. However, it would be
unfortunate if a multitude of funds were set up for each pathology and each type of patient.
Considerable economies of scale could be obtained through a common service. In the long term, an
entire basic package for the whole population could be financed through a common purchasing fund.
Systems for different regimens could be organised, but a number of services could be pooled (billing,
contractualisation, accreditation). As with many countries that have a social protection system, the
most essential health care funding occurs outside the actual Ministry of Health budget. Nevertheless,
the Ministry plays an important role as the supervisory authority for these funds and must even provide
a general grant.
Senegal’s low HIV prevalence, limiting the economic burden generated, the quick reaction of the
health system, the quality of organisation of the care system for PLWHA and finally, the guaranteed
financial commitment from the State in the fight against this disease combine to create a favourable
context for applying the WHO recommendation for complete free access.
The search for the most efficient modalities for funding free access is also a critical issue for countries
that have a higher HIV prevalence. If a country’s need is considerably higher, international and
national funding is also increased. The concept of a purchasing fund may represent a viable avenue
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for funding in these countries. Interestingly, this can be evaluated first in a country like Senegal with
low prevalence before envisaging its feasibility in countries where the epidemic’s economic impact
would be far heavier.
Complete free access to care for PLWHA answers a public health imperative endorsed by the WHO,
which — since 2005 — has recommended its implementation as soon as possible. This recent
recommendation caused an upheaval in reflections on health care funding and the development of
social protection systems, seconded by various international organisations (World Bank, International
Labour Organisation). A highly critical evaluation of the last two decades of promoting financial
participation from patients in poor countries has revived the idea of free health services to promote
access to care. Nonetheless, without a bold policy for health care funding, there is a high risk that this
principle of free access for certain services will be called into question, even though these services are
critical from a public health standpoint (Gilson and McIntyre, 2005). In some countries, overhasty
decisions by policy-makers to provide free access without a real funding strategy has weakened
health structures and discredited the notion of free access.
Providing complete medical care for PLWHA provides an opportunity to initiate this process of free
access. The fight against HIV/AIDS provokes further reflection on the reform of health care systems.
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